In the Financial Times, Jonathan Hillman compares the technology infrastructure including 5G networks built by Chinese companies with the telegraph cables constructed by imperial Great Britain. In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Elizabeth Economy describes why the United States must adopt a strategy of smart competition in its relationship with China. A new report from Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan at the Center for a New American Security explores the increasingly prominent role that Chinese diplomats play in the U.N. system, including work on technological standards in the International Telecommunications Union. The House Committee on Oversight and Reform held a hearing on Wednesday on the risks posed by facial recognition, including its use in authoritarian states.
ZTE was allowed to continue working with U.S. companies, provided that it properly reprimand all employees involved in the violations. However, the Department of Commerce found that ZTE had violated these terms and made false statements regarding its compliance, having fired only 4 senior officials and still providing bonuses to 35 other employees involved in the violations. On 16 April 2018, the Department of Commerce banned U.S. companies from providing exports to ZTE for seven years.[28][29][30] At least 25% of components on recent ZTE smartphones originated from the U.S., including Qualcomm processors and certified Android software with Google Mobile Services.[31][32] An analyst stated that it would take a significant amount of effort for ZTE to redesign its products as to not use U.S.-originated components.[33]
USA declares war on Huawei, with a bit of help from ZTE
Later that month, the U.S. Senate passed a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 that blocked the settlement, and banned the federal government from purchasing equipment from Huawei and ZTE (citing them as national security risks due to risks of Chinese government surveillance). The settlement was criticized by Senators as being "personal favors" between Trump and the Chinese government, as the Chinese government issued a loan for an Indonesian theme park project with a Trump golf course following the May 2018 announcement.[39][40] However, the House version of the bill, signed by Trump, did not include the provision blocking the settlement, but still included the ban on federal purchase of Huawei and ZTE products.[41]
During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, ZTE refused to withdraw from the Russian market. Research from Yale University published on August 10, 2022, identifying how companies were reacting to Russia's invasion identified ZTE in the worst category of "Digging in", meaning Defying Demands for Exit: companies defying demands for exit/reduction of activities.[117]
To be sure, U.S. policymakers cannot ignore the risk of China sabotaging American systems in a crisis. The risk is real, and technological interdependence provides Beijing with additional means (though perhaps lower motivation) to subvert U.S. infrastructure. Washington should take targeted, cost-effective actions to address the problem. But restrictive measures should focus on the highest-risk areas, where Chinese technological influence within the United States could grant Beijing a particularly effective capability to paralyze key U.S. forces or coerce U.S. political leadership at a critical moment. Even then, technology controls should be aligned with a comprehensive national plan to protect U.S. critical infrastructure from all digital and physical hazards.
The U.S. government has numerous options for directly bolstering the cybersecurity and resilience of critical military and civilian systems, which would mitigate not only the risk of Chinese sabotage but also other serious threats, like weather-related outages. With the electrical grid, for example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission could apply stronger mandatory cybersecurity standards to a larger number of entities and enforce them more vigorously.30 The Department of Energy could establish a strategic reserve of large power transformers.31 Congress could allocate federal money to shore up grid vulnerabilities.32 Investments in disaster recovery capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels would also help mitigate the economic and societal damage caused by infrastructure outages once they occur. Any of these efforts might be expensive, so the federal government could focus first on a small subset of assets, like Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure, that face greatest risk from Chinese sabotage.
The World Unpacked is a monthly foreign policy podcast that breaks down the hottest global issues of today with experts, journalists, and policymakers who can explain what is happening, why it matters, and where we go from here.
The US government announced it would suspend or terminate three bilateral agreements with Hong Kong, covering surrender of fugitive offenders, the transfer of sentenced persons, and reciprocal tax exemptions on income derived from the international operation of ships.
The Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) has announced 37 exemption lists, which excluded specific Chinese imports from US additional tariffs. However, the exemption rate is not high with 84 percent of the exclusion requests having been rejected by the USTR until January 31, 2020. With the COVID-19 pandemic worsening in the US, the USTR is now prioritizing the review of requests concerning medical products. It is also seeking public comments on whether to remove additional products subject to Section 301 tariffs that are necessary to the US response to COVID-19. For more information, please see our article: US Tariff Exclusion for Chinese Imports: What is the Status?
Exemption List 1 cover US products, such as shrimp and prawn seedlings, lubricants, and alfalfa meal while, Exemption List 2 affect products, such release agent, whey for fodder, Iso-alkane solvent, and lubricating base oil. Enterprises importing goods from list 1 may apply to Customs for refund of the duties already paid, but must do so within six months from the date of the promulgation of the list.
US Commerce Department announces the addition of five new Chinese entities (including a state-owned enterprise) to its entity list, barring them from buying US parts and components without prior government approval. The new entities targeted are: Sugon, the Wuxi Jiangnan Institute of Computing Technology, Higon, Chengdu Haiguang Integrated Circuit, and Chengdu Haiguang Microelectronics Technology.
The US and China hold trade talks in Beijing. On Friday, February 15, Xi meets with the top negotiators from the US, in what is widely interpreted as a goodwill gesture. At the end of negotiations, the US and China continue to have differences, but agree to keep talking in Washington the following week.
Reacting to the news, Conservatives who have long called for Huawei to be banned decried the Liberal's "lack of action" as "an international embarrassment," suggesting that the delay has cost millions of dollars, though some major wireless providers have already pivoted away from working with Huawei.
Canada has been the last holdout member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States already all deciding to either ban or restrict Huawei from partaking in the implementation of their 5G networks.
If a foreign entity is placed in the UEL, it may face several restrictions, including a complete prohibition from trading and investing in China. Further, Chinese entities will be required to apply for a license to do business with companies on the UEL, similar to the US Entity List setup. Presently, no timeline has been given for releasing the list. However, a Global Times report detailed that British bank HSBC and American delivery service Fedex, could be placed on the UEL for allegedly colluding with Washington in framing Huawei.
However, evidence that there is nothing to fear from using Huawei equipment is of little use, when political decisions have been made. Australia has missed out on lower mobile prices due to this decision, with TPG Telecom shelving plans for a network after the Huawei ban was imposed. The telco had spent about $100 million on gear by then but ditched its plans.
Florida Republican Senator Marco Rubio takes to the Senate floor to talk about U.S. trade policy toward China. He says the trade relationship needs to be restructured and that Chinese smartphone maker ZTE poses a threat to U.S. national security. He also says that U.S. trade policy with China must be separated from the concerns about ZTE and that the trade imbalance must be addressed long term. close
Japan and China held food safety talks, with China declining to provide assurances that it will lift its ban on importing food from the area surrounding the 2011 Fukushima meltdown. Xinhua announced that Abe and Xi had chatted briefly on the sidelines of the G20 conference in Buenos Aires, agreeing that they would step up negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the trilateral trade agreement among China, Japan, and South Korea. The head of Chinese State Security reportedly secretly visited Japan at the end of October, with both sides reportedly eager to create a back channel should relations again deteriorate.
Nov. 10, 2018: Japan and China held food safety talks, with China declining to provide assurances that it will lift its ban on importing food from the area surrounding the 2011 Fukushima meltdown.
The Trump administration has been trying with only some success to persuade allied nations not to use Huawei equipment. Last year, Trump signed a bill that barred the US government from using equipment from Huawei and China's ZTE Corp.
In the frontier regions, groups of armed ethnic minorities have been fighting for autonomy for decades, for them, the military brutality that Bamar anti-coup protesters have experienced since February is nothing but a continuation of the same oppression they have been enduring for decades. In this sense, ethnic minorities provide important insights on the best tactics to fight against the Tatmadaw. Thus, since February, anti-coup protesters, namely members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), have fled to the mountainous periphery of Myanmar to collaborate with ethnic armed groups. Thousands of activists are now learning from these resistance groups how to load a rifle, throw hand grenades, and assemble firebombs, de facto transforming into a guerrilla force. 2ff7e9595c
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